Empirically estimated behavioral models have emerged as the preferred approach to revealing the social opportunity costs of pollution abatement in many areas of environmental economics. This paper identifies conceptual issues in the implementation of the revealed-preference approach to non-point source pollution and provides methods to overcome them. We focus on the common second-best setting where emissions are not measurable at the source and pollution reduction is incentivized indirectly through payments tied to practice adoption. First, we show through simulation that in discrete choice models estimated on micro data, the use of predicted opportunity costs provides an erroneous estimate of underlying abatement costs. We then focus on two metrics commonly used to represent the marginal social costs of abatement actions, namely average and marginal program expenditures incurred by the regulating agency. We show with the use of a theoretical model that these metrics generally fail to reveal underlying social costs, and illustrate the results using an agricultural greenhouse gas model calibrated to California conditions. For each issue, we offer easily implementable alternatives that yield correct abatement supply curves.
conditions. Combined with price information, these models can generate abatement cost estimates (e.g., Richards et al. (1993) ). Yet, because the set of abatement actions is taken as given, this approach may miss important abatement channels. Economic optimization models designed to minimize social abatement costs may partially allay this issue (e.g., McCarl and Schneider (2001) ). Still, the optimization approach rests on heavy assumptions regarding the set of actions available to economic agents as well as their underlying objective. To the extent that it ignores hidden switching costs, it may underestimate social abatement costs (Stavins, 1999) .
In the face of these challenges, environmental economists have increasingly resorted to empirically estimated behavioral models to reveal underlying abatement costs. Importantly, the revealed-preference approach remains agnostic about the economic motives of polluting agents; it makes few assumptions about the physical processes underlying their actions, or their private costs; finally, it uses information about how agents actually behave in response to pecuniary incentives, making it directly relevant for policy. Canonical examples include afforestation to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from land use (Stavins, 1999; Plantinga et al., 1999) and the adoption of reduced tillage to reduce nutrient runoff from agriculture (Wu et al., 2004) .
A close look at the empirical literature on diffuse pollution abatement reveals that, while the benefits of the revealed-preference approach are well understood, its empirical implementation has proven challenging. The heart of the problem lies in the way the estimated behavioral response function-which relates pecuniary incentives to observed adoption behavior-is utilized to elicit the (marginal) social costs of pollution abatement. Problems may arise at two distinct levels: first, the determination of adoption costs, that is, the social costs of taking abatement actions (e.g., dollars per acre of land converted to no till); second, the determination of abatement costs, that is, the social costs of pollution reduction (e.g., dollars per unit of emissions avoided through no-till adoption).
In this paper, we discuss common methodological errors at either level of analysis.
We provide theoretical, simulation-based, and/or empirical insights into their impacts on abatement cost estimates. In each case, we offer alternative methods that would yield correct social cost measures while making use of the same empirically estimated behavioral relationships. The overall message of our paper is thus: the revealed-preference approach can indeed reveal underlying social costs, but some care must be taken upon implementation.
Specifically, we address three important methodological shortcomings. First, in the case where behavioral inference is based on rich micro-level data where observed abatement actions are discrete (e.g., no-till adoption at a point in space) and modeled through limited dependent variable econometric models, we show that correct inference regarding social adoption costs requires, perhaps counterintuitively, to treat actions as probabilistic. Our simulations show that the aggregate, marginal social cost of adoption implied by the fitted micro-level switching costs may widely depart from the assumed, underlying cost distribution. The idea is that using predicted switching costs ignores the role of unobserved costs not captured by included covariates, undermining the very benefits of the revealed-preference approach. By exploiting revealed information on the magnitude of covariate-independent unobserved costs, we demonstrate how the issue can be overcome.
With this caveat in mind, we turn to the central issue of estimating the social costs of diffuse pollution abatement. Many prospective studies on pollution abatement from the agricultural and forestry sector have explored the social costs of per-hectare payments conditional on extensive or intensive margin changes in land use (Stavins, 1999; Plantinga et al., 1999; Pautsch et al., 2001; Antle et al., 2003; Wu et al., 2004; Feng et al., 2005; Lubowski et al., 2006; Kurkalova et al., 2006; Choi and Sohngen, 2010; Kim and Langpap, 2015) . The idea is that government subsidies can compensate landowners for changes in land management that negatively affect their private returns, yet reduce pollution. To the extent that pollution intensity varies spatially due to soils and climate, the per-hectare subsidies represent second-best instruments. 1 We focus on two measures, often used in this second-best context to represent marginal social cost (MSC), that we coin "average program expenditure" (APE) and "marginal program expenditure" (MPE). APE is calculated as total government outlay under the subsidy divided by total pollution abated, while MPE is calculated as the increment in government outlay divided by the increment in abatement between two subsidy levels.
With the help of a theoretical model of emissions abatement through decentralized land use decisions, we investigate the extent to which each metric may fail to capture MSC, and characterize the signs and magnitudes of the attendant errors. We derive new conditions under which APE equals MSC and necessary and sufficient conditions under which it under-or over-estimates MSC. APE overstates MSC whenever the elasticity of abatement with respect to the per-hectare payment exceeds the elasticity of acreage enrollment. In contrast, MPE systematically overstates MSC by a non-negligible amount, as land use subsidies typically involve an inframarginal wealth transfer from taxpayers to landowners. Importantly, the magnitude of the overestimate is shown to depend principally on the convexity of the behavioral response functions with respect to the per-hectare incentive payment, but not on the emissions process itself. To inform future research, we then offer correct and easily implementable alternatives that make use of the same information as that used in the literature.
To get an idea of how critical these issues might be in practice, we illustrate our results with a model of agricultural land use, input application, and GHG emissions where we simulate policies targeting either the extensive (land use) or the intensive (crop management) margin. Our modeling approach allows us to readily derive the underlying MSC schedule and to contrast it with the unit costs obtained from the average or marginal program expenditure methods. Consistent with our analytical results, we find considerable discrepancies between results from these methods and the underlying MSC. Notably, MPE overstates MSC by a factor of two or more depending on the second-best policy examined. For completeness, we also use our model to show how the underlying MSC curve may be approximated using a discrete set of policy simulation points, and how the choice of policy increment may affect the accuracy of the approximation. This last point matters to the extent that existing studies have typically used a small number of simulation runs to trace out abatement supply curves.
Because the MSC of abatement from a sector of the economy largely determines the extent to which this sector ought to participate in abatement efforts, the misrepresentation of MSC in economic studies can have major policy implications. If the calculated unit costs overstate MSC for instance, one could legitimately fear that ensuing policies would under-incentivize pollution abatement from that sector relative to the societal optimum. 2 The present contribution is meant to facilitate the reporting of social costs of pollution abatement in environmental policy-oriented research.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 addresses the use of fitted practice adoption costs in models estimated using micro data. Section 2 develops a theoretical framework to discuss the use of APE and MPE as indicators of MSC in the broader literature. Section 3 derives APE, MPE, and MSC in the context of an agricultural GHG model. Section 4 concludes.
2 In the context of nitrogen oxides emissions, Fowlie et al. (2012) estimate the marginal abatement costs from power plants (point sources) and passenger vehicles (mobile sources) and conclude that large inefficiencies arise because of the lack of regulation coordination across sectors and the resulting failure to equate marginal abatement costs across sources.
Measuring practice adoption costs
This section focuses on practice adoption, that is, the relationship between pecuniary incentives to adopt a pollution-reducing practice and the aggregate amount of practice adoption. It is meant to inform models estimated on rich micro-level data when the adoption process is discrete, for instance, adoption of no till vs. conventional tillage on working lands. Micro-level adoption data is not always available, however. As such, the points made in this section are relevant to many but not all empirical settings and data sets. 3 They matter to the overall discussion of marginal pollution abatement costs because if the costs of adopting a pollution-reducing practice are wrongly estimated, the pollution reduction costs constructed from them will also be wrong.
Model
Models of discrete practice adoption are typically estimated using limited dependent variable econometric models, e.g., the logit model. Because agents are assumed to switch to one alternative based on relative profitability (with the possible consideration of risk premia), researchers have sought to directly recover switching costs from the estimated logit coefficients. This technique requires setting the intercept of the argument of the logistic c.d.f. equal to some known money value, typically the (negative of the) profit from non-adoption, and interpreting the remainder of the argument as the profit from adopting the practice. 4 Formally, assume the following adoption process at a geographical site i: y i = 1 with probability P i 0 with probability 1 − P i
with the probability of adoption parameterized as
, where x i is a vector of covariates (not including an intercept), π 0 represents the observed return to the conventional practice, x i β represents the covariatedependent return to the pollution-reducing practice, and σ i represents unobserved, covariate-independent switching costs. It is assumed that i follows the standard logistic distribution but σ is unobserved (and estimated together with β). The normalization of the intercept to π 0 allows the interpretation of the quantity π 0 + σ i − x i β as the 3 Even if adoption is discrete, the data could be available only at an aggregate level, in which case adoption takes the form of shares (e.g., share of a county's land under forest) that vary continuously with pecuniary incentives, e.g., Stavins (1999) and Plantinga et al. (1999) . 4 The variance of the error term is then estimated as a free parameter since the setting of the intercept "normalizes" the magnitude of the entire parameter vector. net opportunity cost of adopting the practice at point i. 5 Maximum-likelihood estimation of the model is performed using micro data on adoption status and the value of covariates at sample points. This approach has informed several studies including Kurkalova et al. (2004 ), Feng et al. (2005 ), Feng et al. (2006 , Kurkalova et al. (2006) , Rabotyagov (2010) , and Rabotyagov et al. (2014b) .
Estimation of model (1) allows the analyst to recover fitted switching costs, π 0 −x iβ , whereβ denotes the estimate of β. However, the unobserved adoption cost σ i is not included as part of the predicted cost, because i itself is not estimated, although σ is. In a way, when fitted costs alone are used to represent actual costs, only part of the benefits of the revealed-preference approach are realized as the information on the variance of covariate-independent conversion costs (σ) is ignored.
Simulation
We set the number of observations to N = 10, 000 and assume that each observation point covers one acre. The underlying DGP is assumed to follow model (1). For the purpose of the argument, we consider a model with a single covariate x i drawn from a normal distribution with mean µ and standard deviation equal to one. 6 The parameter π 0 is normalized to one as a way to set the currency and is observed by the econometrician. We set values for β (unknown) and σ (unknown), and draw the disturbances i from the standard logistic distribution. Based on the value taken by the true, underlying conversion costs π 0 + σ i − x i β, we then assign the observation to "adopter" (y i = 1) or "non-adopter" (y i = 0). Using the constructed observations (y i , x i , π 0 ) we recover estimates of β and σ through maximum likelihood. 7 We then construct fitted conversion costs for each observation as π 0 − x iβ .
For both true conversion costs and fitted costs, we construct the aggregate marginal adoption cost schedule, which ranks acres converted to the pollution-reducing practice in order of increasing conversion costs. Following common practice, we assign zero costs to observations with negative conversion costs to reflect the fact that adoption would occur even in the absence of pecuniary incentives.
5 If the intercept π0 varies across observations, an intercept can be included in the vector of covariates xi.
6 Setting the variance of xi to one does not restrict the generality of the model as a change in the variance can be offset by changes in β and µ.
7 In robustness checks, we allowed the intercept π0 to vary according to the observation (to reflect differentiated returns to non-adoption), we allowed each observation to have a different area, we added more covariates, and we explored alternative covariate distributions. The points made here survive those generalizations. where the revealed-preference approach is expected to perform better than engineering estimates are precisely those were unobserved factors play a significant role in the adoption process.
Proposed solution
A solution to the above problem is to utilize all the revealed-preference information provided by the estimated behavioral equation, that is, beyond the information contained inβ, that contained inσ, which captures the magnitude of the covariate-independent unobserved conversion costs. This can be accomplished by treating the adoption decision as probabilistic, which is equivalent to assuming that at each sample point only a share of acreage is converted to the pollution-reducing practice. That is, the share of acreage converted at site i is set equal to the predicted probability Λ Any difference between the probabilistic schedule and the true schedule can be traced to the fact that it relies on the estimates of β and σ rather than their true values. As such, for given values of model parameters the two schedules would typically become closer to each other as the sample size N increases.
Measuring marginal abatement costs under second-best policies
We now show how to derive the MSC of pollution abatement in second-best settings where decentralized agents are incentivized through government subsidies to take abatement actions rather than directly reduce pollution. While direct incentives such as pollution taxes would be more efficient instruments, they might not be feasible due to the impossibility to reliably attribute pollution to a particular source. This second-best feature is well-known to the literatures on GHG emissions from agriculture and forestry (e.g., Lubowski et al. (2006) ; Garnache et al. (2016) ), water pollution from agricultural nutrient runoffs (e.g., Wu et al. (2004) ; Rabotyagov et al. (2014a) ), or tailpipe emissions from vehicles (e.g., Fullerton and West (2002) ; Mérel et al. (2014a) ).
This section is relevant to behavioral adoption models estimated on both micro data and aggregated data. It is also relevant beyond revealed-preference approaches, although, as we will show, deriving MSC in the context of a programming approach is relatively straightforward. We begin by developing a simple theoretical framework that will allow us to formally define MSC and contrast it to two measures commonly used in the GHG mitigation literature.
Theoretical framework
There are N decision-making units indexed by i. Pollution abated at site i is assumed to depend on an observable management action or effort k i , with k i ∈ R + . (The variable k i is the extension of the discrete choice y i of Section 1 to a continuum of actions.)
Under business-as-usual (BAU), no action is taken, that is, k i = 0. For instance, a management action may be the conversion of land from agricultural uses to forestry activities as in Stavins (1999) or the adoption of a carbon-sequestering practice on agricultural land as in Pautsch et al. (2001) ; in such cases, k i represents the number of acres converted to forestry or subject to the new practice, relative to BAU. We abstract from adverse selection issues, that is, we assume that BAU levels are known to the regulator so that, for each unit i, k i represents actions leading to truly additional pollution reduction relative to BAU.
To fix ideas, for the rest of this section we assume that pollution is generated in the form of emissions, e.g., GHG emissions from land use. We denote by e i (k i ) the emissions abatement resulting from k i , with e i (k i ) ≥ 0 and e i (0) = 0, and we assume that e i is continuously differentiable and increasing on R + . We denote by c i (k i ) the decision-maker's opportunity cost of taking action, with c i (0) = 0 and c i (
We further assume that the c i functions are continuously differentiable, increasing, and convex. We do not impose the condition that c i (0) = 0, although we do not rule it out either. This allows us to consider the case where marginal abatement costs at zero may be different from zero, which could happen if there are physical constraints on k i . For instance, k i may represent afforestation and unit i may not have any land in forest in the baseline. We add the technical assumption that the composite function
i , where e −1 i denotes the inverse of e i , be (weakly) convex and continuously differentiable on its domain. As we show in Section 2.1.1, this assumption ensures that the first-best allocation of abatement can be decentralized through an emissions abatement subsidy (or equivalently, an emissions tax). Note that it does not require that the emission functions e i themselves be concave, although such an assumption would certainly ensure the convexity of
In what follows, we assume that the regulator (i) may be able to incentivize emission reductions e i directly through a per-unit emissions abatement subsidy (first-best scenario) or (ii) may be restricted to using incentives on management actions k i by rewarding them according to a nondecreasing payment schedule p i (k i ) (second-best scenario). Unless stated otherwise, we restrict this schedule to be non-discriminatory and linear in actions, that is, p i (k i ) = p × k i . We focus on subsidies rather than taxes because the empirical literature we discuss has exclusively investigated subsidy 9 This cost represents both the private and social cost of taking action. 10 Our theoretical framework, although seemingly stylized, is general enough to capture the main tradeoffs investigated in the empirical literature on GHG mitigation from the AFOLU sector. First, although we adopt continuous action variables ki, the framework conceptually applies to a set of discrete actions. The assumption of continuous action variables, coupled with differentiability assumptions, allows us to characterize the first-and second-best solutions using standard optimization techniques. Second, the fact that we model actions as values taken by a one-dimensional variable is not as restrictive as it seems. Imagine that there are two discrete actions that can be taken exclusive of one another, for instance either retiring agricultural land or changing agricultural practices, as in Feng et al. (2006) . Each action would correspond in our model to two distinct values of ki. In other contexts where two actions may be taken together or in isolation, ki would take on three values: one for each single action and the third one for the combination of both. This reasoning also extends to sets of N continuous actions as in Kim and Langpap (2015) or Garnache et al. (2016) , as one can always map a subset of R N into R. The assumption that the functions ci be increasing and convex, although admittedly restrictive, ensures that second-best incentives lead to well-defined behavioral responses. Relaxing the convexity assumption, or allowing for a fixed cost of taking action, would lead to discontinuities in the behavioral responses to second-best incentives. These complications would add nothing to the points made in this paper.
schemes, and the common methodological shortcomings we highlight below are directly related to the use of subsidy expenditures in abatement cost calculations.
Note that the regulator may be able to offer discriminatory compensations equal to c i (k i ), in which case (marginal) program expenditure equals the (marginal) social cost of actions taken, whether in a first-or second-best setting (the difference between the first-and second-best settings being the actual set of actions incentivized to achieve the abatement target). This scenario is perhaps less interesting empirically as it assumes perfect information on the part of the regulator about agents' costs (Plantinga, 1997; Mason and Plantinga, 2013) . 11 There is no particular methodological issue related to the derivation of social costs in this case.
First-best effort allocation and its decentralization
Denote by E the abatement target. The first-best allocation of emission reductions
where λ 1 denotes the marginal social cost (MSC) of abatement and it is assumed that for a meaningful range of abatement levels E, the constraint set is nonempty. Denoting by µ i the Lagrange multiplier associated with the non-negativity constraint k i ≥ 0 and assuming a binding emissions target, the first-order necessary conditions of program
Denote byk = (k 1 , . . . ,k I ) the resulting first-best effort allocation. Ifk i > 0, then
That is, the marginal opportunity cost of effort is equated to its marginal social benefit, which is the product of the shadow price of pollution by the marginal abatement. Ifk i = 0, then it must be that
that is, the marginal opportunity cost of taking action exceeds its marginal benefit at
Now consider the problem of decentralizing the first-best allocation through an emission reduction subsidy whereby each unit of abatement is subsidized at a constant rate s. The first-best decentralization problem is
where λ denotes the decentralized first-best MSC. Since the functions e i are increasing, they can be inverted and the decentralization problem can be rewritten in terms of emission reductions, as follows:
Since the functions c i • e
are convex, the second theorem of welfare economics implies that the first-best allocationk can be obtained as a decentralized equilibrium by choosing s = λ 1 . In addition, given our assumptions on the functions c i and e i , the resulting MSC schedule λ(E) = λ 1 (E) will be continuous. 12 In Appendix A, we show by way of example that if the functions c i • e −1 i fail to be convex, then the first-best allocation may not be achievable through an emission incentive scheme. We also show how such failure may result in discontinuities in the MSC schedule λ 1 (E).
In what follows, we maintain our assumption that the functions c i • e −1 i are convex, so that the first-best allocation can be obtained as a decentralized equilibrium by subsidizing emission reductions e i at a price equal to λ 1 .
Second-best effort allocation
Now suppose that instead of directly rewarding emission reductions, the regulator is limited to encouraging effort k i by paying a subsidy p per unit of effort. The second-best effort allocation problem is 
We assume that for a meaningful range of abatement levels E, the constraint set of
program (4) is nonempty.
We denote byk i (p) the solution function to the inner program faced by unit i in The MSC of abatement under the second-best policy is the shadow value of the abatement constraint in program (4), λ 2 . Here, we derive an expression for its value under the assumption of continuous differentiability of the functionsk i (p) in a neighborhood ofp(E).
In Appendix B, we analyze the case where at least one of the functionŝ
The second-best program can be rewritten as
with first-order conditions
Since the functions e i are increasing while the functionsk i are nondecreasing, the
) itself is nondecreasing in p, so that higher effort payments lead to higher emissions abatement. Then, condition (7) determines the optimal effort pricê p(E). Plugging backp(E) into condition (6) yields the value of λ 2 at the abatement target E:
Equation (8) indicates that the MSC of abatement under the action payment scheme is a weighted average of marginal costs of actions divided by a weighted average of marginal abatements of actions across all units, where the weights are the numberŝ
, that is, the marginal behavioral responses to action rewards. Denoting by N + (E) the set of sites for whichp(E) > c i (0), that is, those choosing to participate in the incentive program atp(E), we can rewrite the MSC as 13
At this point it may be useful to clarify what drives the difference between the second-best MSC schedule λ 2 (E) and the first-best MSC schedule λ 1 (E), that is, what makes the second-best incentive scheme inefficient. In the first-best allocation, the MSC of abatement is equal to the ratio
for any site i such thatk i > 0, which implies that this ratio is equated across participating sites. In contrast, the secondbest incentive scheme always equates the marginal costs c i (k i ) across participating sites. Therefore, it replicates the first-best outcome whenever e i (k i ) is also equated across participating sites for all values of p, that is, e i (c i ) −1 (p) = φ(p) for some function φ that does not depend on the indices i of participating sites. Said differently, for the second-best scheme to be efficient the composite functions e i • (c i ) −1 must be independent of i, which is equivalent to saying that the functions e i (k i ) can each be written as the same function of c i ( 
β . In this case emissions are proportional to the action taken and the emission rate is identical across sites.
While the assumption of linearity may make sense in certain settings (for instance, if k i represents acres converted to forest at a certain geographical location), the assumption of identical emission rates is restrictive in terms of site heterogeneity as it precludes local biophysical factors from influencing the emissions process.
Special case 2: Suppose that e i (k i ) = αc i (k i ) for some α > 0, that is, emission reductions are proportional to action costs, and the factor of proportionality is siteindependent. Then, we have e i (k i ) = αc i (k i ) and the problem satisfies the efficiency restriction with φ(p) = αp. In addition, equation (9) implies that λ 2 = λ 1 = 1 α , i.e., the MSC of abatement is constant. The allocation of emissions abatement across sites does not matter in this case because the total abatement costs are always equal to E α . Note that this case allows for site heterogeneity in costs and emissions, however it imposes restrictions on the form of this heterogeneity since costs are perfectly correlated with emissions abatement across sites.
Further characteristics of the second-best MSC schedule λ 2 (E) and its position relative to the first-best MSC schedule λ 1 (E) are discussed in appendices. In Appendix B, we explain why the second-best MSC may be discontinuous even when the first-best MSC is not. In Appendix C, we show that λ 2 (E) may not lie everywhere to the left of λ 1 (E), and that in important cases the two schedules will necessarily cross at large enough abatement levels.
Empirical derivation of second-best marginal social cost curves
We now present two empirical methods used in the recent GHG mitigation literature to derive MSC curves (abatement supply curves) in second-best settings. We explain when and why they may differ from MSC and provide rules of thumb to evaluate the size of the error resulting from using them in cases where they do not reflect MSC. We then propose easily implementable solutions to elicit or at least approximate the true MSC curve in the context of existing empirical approaches.
Use of average program expenditure
Using the notation introduced above, program expenditure under the second-best action subsidy can be written as PE = p i∈Nk i (p). Average program expenditure per unit of abatement (APE) is then defined as APE =
. APE measures have been used in several prominent GHG mitigation studies, starting with the seminal contributions by Stavins (1999) and Newell and Stavins (2000) .
These studies were among the first to derive unit cost curves for carbon sequestration through forestation in the U.S. using a revealed-preference approach whereby observed land use decisions serve to identify the underlying opportunity costs of land conversion.
Once the behavioral model has been estimated, the simulation assumes that landowners are subsidized per acre of cropland afforested and taxed for acres deforested. Because the subsidy and tax levels are assumed to be the same while the impacts of afforestation and deforestation on carbon sequestration are not symmetric, the policy investigated is not first best. In the agricultural land management literature, Pautsch et al. (2001) investigate per-hectare payments for conservation tillage adoption in Iowa and calculate APE under various payment schemes. The same is done in the follow-up study by Feng et al. (2006) . The use of APE as an indicator of MSC in second-best settings may have initially been encouraged by the fact that under the first-best policy that subsidizes emission reductions, MSC is actually equal to APE, provided that all and only additional emissions abated relative to BAU are subsidized. 14 Indeed, keeping with our notation, the MSC of a pollution reduction subsidy λ 1 per unit of abatement is λ 1 =
is, it is equal to APE.
Proposition 1 Under a first-best emissions abatement subsidy rewarding only additional abatement, MSC=APE at each level of abatement.
Unfortunately, the equivalence between MSC and APE does not translate to secondbest settings, except under very specific assumptions regarding the abatement process, that we now make explicit.
14 Additional here refers to emissions abated at a given subsidy level that would not be abated in the absence of a subsidy.
To see why APE generally differs from MSC in second-best settings, one may first note that as long as the behavioral functionsk i (p) are continuous, APE will also be a continuous function of E. Since the true MSC curve may be discontinuous (see Appendix B), it cannot be the same as the APE curve. Second, one can directly compare analytical expressions for APE and MSC. Assuming that the abatement target is such that the MSC curve is locally differentiable, APE at the elicitation pricep ≡ p(E) is equal to MSC if and only if
, that is,
where N + denotes the set of units induced to supply effort under the target E. Condition (10) implies that the rate of increase of aggregate actions with respect to the payment equals the rate of increase of ultimate emissions abatement. Integrating expression (10) in a neighborhood ofp, we obtain
i.e., aggregate abatement must be proportional to aggregate actions at all payment levels. There is, of course, no need for such a relationship to hold even locally. We can, however, point out special cases under which it will. The first special case below corresponds to Special case 1 considered above. The second one is new and is labeled as Special case 3. We show at the end of this section that in Special case 2 above, APE may differ from MSC even though the second-best scheme is efficient.
Special case 1: Assume that the functions e i are linear and all the same, that is, e i (k i ) = βk i for some β > 0. Condition (11) is globally satisfied for A = β without further restrictions on the form of thek i functions, and the MSC is equal top
β and is a continuous function that replicates the first-best outcome. 15 In this case, subsidizing actions taken is tantamount to subsidizing emission reductions as the two are related 15 The reason why the action subsidy replicates the first-best outcome in this case is an artifact of our assumption that emissions ei only depend on one action. If we extend our model to more than one action, and the second-best policy only rewards one of them, then that policy does not replicate the first-best outcome.
by a constant factor of proportionality. 16 Special case 3: Assume that the functionsk i are all linear, that isk i (p) = α i p for some α i ≥ 0 and the functions e i are also linear, that is, e i (k i ) = β i k i for some β i ≥ 0.
In that case, condition (11) is globally satisfied for the constant A = i β i α i i α i
, and the MSC curve is linear and given by λ 2 (E) =
It is easy to show that the firstbest MSC in this setting is given by λ 1 (E) = E i β 2 i α i and that λ 1 (E) ≤ λ 2 (E), that is, the second-best scheme is not efficient.
More generally, APE may either understate or overstate MSC, and a clear and intuitive statement can be made regarding the sign of the discrepancy. Specifically, it can be shown from the expression of APE and equation (9) 
, which can be rearranged aŝ
Defining the elasticity of aggregate abatement with respect to the subsidy as
and the elasticity of aggregate effort with respect to the subsidy as
, condition (12) leads to the following proposition.
Proposition 2 APE overstates the MSC of an effort subsidy if and only if the elasticity of aggregate abatement with respect to the effort subsidy (η e ) is larger than the elasticity of aggregate effort with respect to the effort subsidy (η k ).
Given that APE would equal MSC under a first-best, fully additional abatement subsidy, this condition seems intuitive: under an incentive scheme that rewards behavior as opposed to ultimate abatement, APE will overstate the underlying MSC of the program as long as ultimate abatement ( i e i (k i )) responds more elastically than behavior ( ik i ) to the second-best incentive.
16 A variant of Special case 1 is implemented in Pautsch et al. (2001) and Feng et al. (2006) . These authors evaluate, among other policies, a policy that rewards decision-making units at different perunit rates pi, such that payment to unit i is piki. Emission functions are assumed to be heterogenous but linear, i.e., ei = βiki. In this case, a policy that sets the prices pi so as to minimize government payments while achieving the abatement target replicates the first-best outcome, and the APE of such policy indeed represents its MSC as it mimics a subsidy on emissions abatement.
Consider for instance Special case 2 discussed above where e i (k i ) = αc i (k i ) for some
2 , that is, opportunity costs are quadratic in effort. We then have c i (k i ) = β i k i and thereforek i (p) = p β i . This implies that
. It is then easy to see that condition (11) is violated, that is, aggregate emission reductions are not proportional to aggregate actions, and η e = 2η k . In fact, a quick computation confirms that APE = 2 α , that is, APE is constant and overstates MSC by a factor of two. Although the second-best scheme is socially efficient in this case, program expenditures are twice as large as they would be under an emission reduction subsidy that yields the same aggregate abatement. Another example of an efficient subsidy scheme for which APE would exceed MSC is one where non-additional emission reductions are subsidized, for instance because BAU actions are not observable by the regulator. Therefore, the mere fact that the policy instrument considered leads to efficient abatement is not sufficient to validate the use of APE as a measure of MSC. 
Use of marginal program expenditure
, where p t represents the subsidy level at a given iteration and k i represents net forested area. This ratio is the incremental analog to MPE and will thus converge to it as the increment size (that is, the difference between p t and p t−1 ) goes to zero. The same approach is taken in an earlier forestation study by Plantinga et al. (1999) . It is also the approach followed by Choi and Sohngen (2010) to derive the MSC of carbon sequestration in agricultural soils through conservation tillage incentives and by Kim and Langpap (2015) in the context of subsidies for the adoption of carbon-saving forest management practices. 17 Yet, there is no obvious reason why MPE should reflect MSC. The only instance where MPE reflects MSC is when subsidies are structured so as to just compensate agents for the opportunity costs of their actions.
17 Of these studies, all but Choi and Sohngen (2010) use a revealed-preference approach. Figure 3 The use of marginal program expenditure in the first-best scenario. Marginal program expenditure overstates the marginal social cost λ 1 (E) because it includes the increase in infra-marginal quasi-rents (the darkly shaded area) in addition to the expenditure needed to induce additional abatement (the lightly shaded area).
Proposition 3 If the effort payment schedule is site-specific and structured so that
, which requires the regulating agency to know private opportunity costs, then MPE=MSC irrespective of site participation and effort level.
Note that Proposition 3 establishes an equivalence between MPE and MSC irrespective of the set of abatement actions actually taken. As such, it applies to efficient and inefficient schemes. Whether the scheme is efficient will depend on whether actions are taken in increasing order of cost per unit of emissions abated, which will depend on features of the incentive program not explicitly represented here.
Going back to the case where compensation is nondiscriminatory (p
and assuming differentiability locally, MPE is formally defined as
The second term in (13) represents the MSC of abatement λ 2 (E). (To see why, apply the implicit function theorem to the equality i∈N + e i (k i (p(E))) = E and use (9).)
Since the first term in (13) is positive, MPE will systematically overstate the MSC of abatement. That is, unlike for APE, there are no functional forms restrictions under which the use of MPE can be justified.
Furthermore, there is reason to believe that the discrepancy between MPE and MSC can be substantial. In essence, equation (13) includes not only the opportunity cost of marginal actions necessary to increase abatement, but also the increase in program costs caused by overcompensating inframarginal abatement actions (that is, those already incentivized under lower subsidy levels). This overcompensation is a wealth transfer that should either be ignored, or appropriately accounted for if one explicitly seeks to model the opportunity cost of public funds. Because the overcompensation applies to all inframarginal units, it will typically represent a non-negligible amount.
The argument can be easily made by looking at what MPE would measure under a first-best emissions abatement subsidy. In that case, using MPE would cause one to use the curve marginal to λ 1 (E) instead of the curve λ 1 (E) itself. (We say that a curve ρ(E)
.) The overestimation of MSC caused by this procedure is illustrated in Figure 3 . The area shaded in light gray represents the increase in the opportunity cost of abatement, that is, the incremental social cost as abatement is increased from some level E to E + dE. The MSC is the limit of this area divided by dE, as dE goes to zero. Using MPE amounts to adding the area shaded in dark gray to the calculation, clearly a non-negligible overstatement of cost. The resulting curve, the curve marginal to λ 1 (E), is also shown on the figure.
Going back to second-best settings, in Special case 1 with linear and identical emission functions MPE overestimates MSC, and the resulting curve coincides with the curve that is marginal to the MSC curve λ 2 (E) (which in this case further coincides with the first-best MSC curve). In Special case 2, with quadratic costs of actions
2 ), MPE is constant and equal to APE, and it overestimates MSC by a factor of two. In Special case 3, a quick computation shows that MPE = 2λ 2 (E), that is, MSC is overestimated by a factor of two when using MPE. As in Special case 1, the curve obtained from MPE happens to be the curve that is marginal to the true MSC curve λ 2 (E).
More generally, in second-best settings the relative magnitude of the discrepancy between MPE and MSC will critically depend on the convexity of the behavioral response functionsk i (p), and, perhaps surprisingly, not on the emission functions e i (k i ). 18 To understand why, suppose that the behavioral response functions can be parameterized (at least locally) as follows:k i (p) = α i p δ i , where α i > 0 and δ i > 0. The parameters δ i parameterize the convexity of the behavioral response functions. Using expression 18 Of course, the shape of the emissions functions still matters for the position of the second-best MSC relative to that of the first-best MSC.
(13), we obtain
Expression (14) concave (δ i < 1), MSC is overestimated by a factor greater than two, while if they are convex (δ i > 1) it is overestimated by a factor less than two. In addition, the emissions abatement functions e i (k i ) do not influence the relative size of the overestimation.
Proposition 4 suggests that the use of MPE results in inflated measures of MSC.
Indeed, Lubowski et al. (2006) find marginal abatement costs through forestation in the U.S. that are significantly higher than those reported in earlier engineering and programming studies for a large and relevant range of abatement levels (up to twice as large for a range of carbon prices from $20 to $50/ton). The authors attribute these differences to their use of the revealed-preference approach. Another explanation could be that the correct MSC curve lies closer to those derived in earlier studies, so that the programming and revealed-preference approaches may agree on the magnitude of carbon sequestration costs.
In Section 3, we derive MPE, APE and MSC for a set of second-best policies aimed at reducing GHG emissions from agriculture. Our results confirm that using APE leads to a smaller error than using MPE, although none of these measures perfectly reflects MSC over the range of abatement targets considered.
Proposed solutions
The preceding analysis has shown that while APE replicates MSC under very specific conditions, and may therefore be close to it when such conditions are close to being satisfied, MPE typically overestimates MSC by a non-trivial amount. This leads us to ask the following question: is there a theoretically correct and practically feasible way of deriving the MSC curve in second-best settings? The answer is yes, both in the context of models aimed at recovering the equivalent of our opportunity costs c i (k i ) econometrically (Antle et al., 2003) or through programming approaches (Choi and Sohngen, 2010; Garnache et al., 2016) , and in the context of revealed-preference models that directly estimate the functionsk i (p) econometrically (Stavins, 1999; Plantinga et al., 1999; Pautsch et al., 2001; Lubowski et al., 2006; Kim and Langpap, 2015) .
In the context of programming models, MSC is directly given by the shadow value of the abatement target constraint. Two possibilities may arise in practice for the implementation of the second-best program (4) and the derivation of MSC. First, one may implement a bilevel program that includes both the inner optimization programs of each site i and the outer program solved by the regulator to find the subsidy level p that achieves the abatement target E at the lowest opportunity cost. 20 In that case, the exact shadow value of the abatement constraint is given by the solver at each abatement target and no further calculation is required. The MSC curve is constructed by arraying abatement targets and corresponding shadow values λ 2 .
A second approach that does not rely on bilevel programming techniques consists of approximating the MSC curve by iteratively increasing the subsidy level p for the set of inner programs, and recovering the marginal cost ex post. At each incremental level of the subsidy, say p t , MSC is approximated by
, the ratio of the increment in opportunity costs to incremental abatement. This technique will generate a curve that approximates the underlying MSC curve as the size of the subsidy increment goes to zero, but this curve will remain distinct from the true underlying MSC. In the empirical example below, we illustrate how different increment sizes affect the accuracy of the approximation. This method can also be used in the context of simulation models built upon econometrically estimated opportunity costs (Antle et al., 2003) .
In the context of revealed-preference models, the focus of this paper, the functionŝ k i (p) are estimated directly without a formal representation of the underlying opportunity costs c i (k i ). Although the opportunity costs are not directly available in this case, the MSC curve can still be approximated as the behavioral functions reveal the opportunity costs associated with incremental changes in k i induced by the secondbest subsidy. That is, if the increase from p t−1 to p t causes the efforts k i to increase, 20 Bilevel programs such as program (4) are optimization programs that contain a second optimization program in their constraints. These programs are referred to as the "outer" and "inner" programs, respectively, and the solution of the "outer" program depends on the solution of the "inner" program. Such mathematical problems have a long history in operations research and algorithms have been developed to solve them by replacing the "inner" program by its first-order optimality conditions (Bracken and McGill, 1973; Fortuny-Amat and McCarl, 1981; Bard, 2013) . Bilevel programs are solved in the GAMS software using the Extended Mathematical Programming (EMP) platform (www.gams.com/.../extended mathematical programs.htm).
this change reveals that the opportunity costs associated with the effort increment are
. Consequently, the MSC of abatement should be approximated by
, which is clearly the incremental analog to expression (9).
We conclude this analytical section by stating that MPE should generally not be used to reflect MSC, and that the use of APE, while justified under very specific circumstances (notably under a first-best abatement subsidy when all abatement is additional), is rendered moot by the availability of easily implementable procedures that either exactly delineate the underlying MSC curve or at least converge to it as the step size goes arbitrarily small.
Empirical illustration: agricultural GHG mitigation in California
We illustrate the theoretical insights of Section 2 by deriving unit cost curves for GHG mitigation from field crop agriculture in the Central Valley of California. The use of a programming approach where we explicitly model the equivalent of the cost functions c i allows us to easily derive the exact MSC using the reported shadow value of the abatement constraint. We then compare the APE and MPE curves to the underlying MSC curve. We also compare the exact MSC schedule to its approximation obtained from incremental analysis, the only option available in revealed-preference approaches.
In line with our analytical results, we find that MPE systematically overestimates MSC by a non-negligible amount. Furthermore, although APE may be close to MSC at some abatement levels, in our application it cannot be used to reliably approximate MSC over large ranges. We also explore the effect of the increment size, e.g., the rise in the abatement target or the subsidy level, on the discrepancy between the approximated MSC curve and the underlying MSC curve.
Empirical model
We use the regionalized optimization model of California crop production of Garnache et al. (2016) . California is a relevant setting to investigate GHG mitigation from the agricultural sector since it has the most advanced GHG mitigation policy in the U.S., including recent plans to reduce emissions from the agricultural sector. 21
The model contains 22 regions, seven cropping activities, and four explicit inputs (land, water, fertilizer, and tillage). (All other inputs are employed in fixed proportions with land.) The model features regional land and water constraints and is calibrated to economic and agronomic information using positive mathematical programming (Howitt, 1995; Mérel et al., 2011 Mérel et al., , 2014b . The model specification consists of cropand region-specific generalized CES production functions and allows for continuous changes in crop acreage and in fertilizer, irrigation, and tillage intensities. Biophysical information obtained from the biogeochemical model DAYCENT (Del Grosso et al., 2001 ) is used to calibrate crop yield responses to input intensities and to derive emission rates per hectare for carbon dioxide, nitrous oxide, and methane conditional on crop choice and input intensities. Details about the structure and calibration of the model are available in Garnache et al. (2016) .
Second-best policies are implemented for a discrete set of abatement targets using a bilevel programming approach similar in structure to equation (4) above. To illustrate issues associated with the derivation of second-best MSC curves, we consider two policies: (i) a single subsidy to wheat acreage, wheat being a carbon-sequestering crop relative to other crops in our model, and (ii) a mixed policy combining subsidies for reductions in nitrogen fertilizer and for reductions in tillage intensity, two practices that have been shown in agronomic and economic studies to reduce GHG emissions (De Gryze et al., 2011; Ogle et al., 2012; van Kessel et al., 2013; Pautsch et al., 2001; Antle and Ogle, 2012) . Therefore, we explore carbon policies targeting either the extensive or the intensive margin.
Results
Figure 4 depicts unit cost measures of GHG abatement for the subsidy on wheat acreage. Figure 5 does the same for the combined subsidies to reduce nitrogen fertilizer and tillage intensity. Total GHG abatement is expressed in metric tonnes of CO 2 equivalent (tCO 2 e). The exact value of MSC in our model is given by the shadow value of the abatement constraint λ 2 (E), which is directly obtainable from the solver used to implement our bilevel program. 22
MPE is calculated as in Lubowski et al. (2006) for each increment of the abatement target-and is therefore an approximation to the true MPE. MPE substantially of 2006). In 2014, the California Air Resources Board (CARB), charged with the rule-making process for AB 32, approved in its First Update to the AB 32 Scoping Plan the objective of establishing GHG emission reduction planning targets for agriculture for the period leading to 2050 (CARB, 2014, pg. 61) . 22 We use the JAMS solver in GAMS. overestimates the MSC of the two second-best policies examined, e.g., by a factor of two for abatement levels exceeding 0.02 million tCO 2 e under the wheat acreage subsidy and 0.04 million tCO 2 e under the combined nitrogen fertilizer and tillage intensity subsidies.
For both policies, APE and MSC remain close at low abatement targets but the discrepancy between the two curves increases as abatement targets become more strin-gent. In particular, the APE curve cannot be close to the MSC curve in the presence of discontinuities in the second-best MSC curve. Discontinuities are notable in Figures   4 and 5 at 0.28 million tCO 2 e, and at 0.80 million tCO 2 e and 1.25 million tCO 2 e, respectively. These discontinuities correspond to a choice variable hitting a bound so that adjustment along this margin is no longer possible at higher abatement targets, or to a change in the set of binding resource constraints. 23 They are the empirical pendant of the discontinuities arising in the theoretical model of Section 2 whenever a new site is induced to participate in the subsidy program (see Appendix B for details).
Furthermore, as discussed in Section 2, APE may underestimate or overestimate MSC.
For example, APE is always above the true MSC under the wheat acreage subsidy, but under the mixed policy it is below MSC for abatement targets inferior to 0.2 million tCO 2 e and above MSC beyond that abatement level.
When the MSC is not directly obtainable, as in the context of revealed-preference approaches, it can nonetheless be approximated at each subsidy iteration by using information from the previous iteration. Since this is merely an approximation, the accuracy of the MSC curve obtained relative to the underlying MSC curve will depend on how small the subsidy increments are. To illustrate the effect of the size of the increment on the accuracy of the MSC approximation, in Figures 4 and 5 we show MSC curves obtained from small and large abatement target increments. 24 For small increments, the discrepancy between the approximated MSC and the true MSC curves is minimal. This is a welcome result as it implies that even when the true MSC is not directly observable, the analyst can derive a meaningful approximation to the true MSC curve. In contrast, large increments (here with only ten increments over the range of abatement investigated) lead to substantial discrepancies under the two second-best policies examined. These results suggest that tightening simulation increments could improve prediction accuracy substantially. This last remark is relevant to the extent that most existing studies have derived unit cost curves using only a few simulation runs. 25
23 Under the wheat acreage subsidy, the acreage reallocation towards wheat, which is the least waterintensive crop, causes the water constraint to be become slack in one region, while under the mixed policy, no further reductions in tillage intensity are possible as the no-till technology (a tillage intensity of zero) is chosen for wheat in some regions. 24 Since our model is specified as a bilevel program, we perform increments on the abatement target. 25 Because MPE is also computed from one iteration to the next in practice, it is also an approximation. We do not discuss the effect of the subsidy increment on the accuracy of the approximation here since MPE is an incorrect measure of MSC. This paper cautions against important pitfalls made when leveraging the revealedpreference approach to elicit the social costs of pollution abatement.
Micro-level datasets that relate pollution-reducing practice adoption to existing pecuniary incentives and other covariates capturing locally relevant factors represent a promising data source to identify both the behavioral responses of economic agents to environmental policy and their underlying abatement costs. The increased availability of spatially explicit land use data over large regions and at a highly disaggregated scale is expected to make the revealed-preference approach even more popular in the future. We have shown that the use of fitted practice adoption costs, as predicted by limited dependent variable approaches estimated on micro data, can lead to estimates of aggregate social costs that bear little resemblance to the assumed, underlying cost distribution. A simple alternative was proposed that makes use of the entire set of estimated model parameters and leads to correct social cost estimates.
We have then discussed two approaches used in the empirical literature on greenhouse gas mitigation to derive marginal social costs (MSC) of abatement in second-best settings where abatement cannot be subsidized directly. The two approaches rely on the use of econometrically estimated simulation models that relate behavioral responses to second-best subsidies while tracking program expenditures. One approach uses average program expenditure (APE) at each subsidy level while the other relies on marginal program expenditure (MPE) computed between consecutive subsidy increments.
We have shown analytically and illustrated with the use of an empirical model that both approaches generally fail to accurately represent the MSC of second-best incentive schemes, and might therefore be misleading for policy. We found that the use of APE can only be justified under very restrictive assumptions, and that it may lead to underor overestimation of MSC depending on the relative sizes of the elasticity of abatement actions and that of ultimate emissions abatement with respect to the subsidy level. It also fails to capture any discontinuities in the MSC curve. In our empirical application, APE leads to relatively minor inaccuracies in second-best GHG abatement curves at low enough abatement targets.
In contrast, the use of MPE appears to be a more serious problem as it can lead to significant overestimation of MSC. In our empirical application to agricultural GHG mitigation, MPE overestimates the MSC of abatement by a factor of about two for second-best policies targeting either the extensive (crop choice) or intensive (input intensity) margin. It would thus lead a policy maker seeking to minimize social abatement costs across sectors of the economy to under-incentivize GHG emission reductions from agricultural fields. First assume that there is only one site with cost function c 1 (k 1 ) = k 2 1 and abatement process described by the function e −1 1 (e 1 ) = e 3 1 − 4e 2 1 + 6e 1 . This function is strictly increasing on R + and therefore can be inverted to obtain the direct emission reduction function e 1 (k 1 ), represented in Figure This MSC is represented in Figure A .2 as the thin blue curve. It also represents the private marginal cost of abatement, hence the supply curve under an emission reduction subsidy will be given by the thick blue curve. Due to the non-monotonicity of the firstbest MSC in this case, the first-best allocation cannot be decentralized for the range of abatement levels (E 1 , E 2 ). For abatement targets in this range, an emission price equal tos would lead site 1 to supply at either E 1 or E 2 . Now assume that there is a second site with cost function c 2 (k 2 ) = 7k 2 2 2 and abatement function e 2 (k 2 ) = k 2 . Its marginal abatement cost is represented as the thin green 26 The function e1 is tedious to write down but there is a closed-form solution for it. When only site 1 is present, the MSC of abatement coincides with the thin blue curve, and the abatement supply under emission pricing is given by the thick blue curve. When both sites are present, the MSC of abatement is given by the thin red curve and the abatement supply under emissions pricing is given by the thick red curve.
curve in Figure A. 2. The resulting MSC of abatement λ 1 (E) is represented as the thin red curve. At any point on this curve, both sites are contributing to overall emissions abatement. However, the MSC curve is discontinuous at the abatement level at which it becomes socially optimal to switch some of the abatement previously allocated to site 2 to site 1, so that immediately to the right of the discontinuity site 1 allocates more abatement than immediately to the left of it, and vice-versa for site 2. There are two socially optimal allocations of abatement at this discontinuity, and only one everywhere else. In addition, abatement targets in the range (E 3 , E 4 ) are not obtainable through a decentralized incentive scheme, because pricing emissions ats would result in an aggregate abatement supply equal to either E 3 or E 4 .
B Discontinuity of the MSC schedule λ 2 (E)
Suppose that at some abatement target E 0 , the eliciting price p 0 ≡p(E 0 ) implicitly defined by condition (7) is such that for some unit i 0 , c i 0 (0) = p 0 (which implies thatk i 0 (p 0 ) = 0), butk i 0 (p) is not differentiable at p 0 . In Figure 2 Due to the added terms at the numerator and the denominator, it is clear that there is no reason why the limit given by (A-2) should equal that given by (A-1). Said differently, the MSC curve need not be globally continuous, and in fact will typically be discontinuous whenever a new site is induced to participate in the second-best incentive program. This lack of continuity generalizes to cases where multiple margins of adjustment may be sequentially leveraged to provide pollution abatement, as in the empirical illustration of Section 3. 27
Note that given the assumptions of our model there is no discontinuity in the firstbest marginal abatement cost schedule, even at pollution price levels at which new sites enter into the abatement program. However, the second-best schedule will typically be discontinuous at such points. Consequently, even when the first-best MSC curve is globally continuous, one should not expect to obtain continuous second-best MSC curves.
C Relative positions of the schedules λ 1 (E) and λ 2 (E)
One point of confusion in the literature has been whether one should expect the secondbest MSC, λ 2 (E), to exceed the first-best MSC, λ 1 (E), at all abatement levels, that is, whether the second-best curve should lie above the first-best curve (see, for instance, Antle et al. (2003, pg. 237 ) and Stoorvogel (2006, pg. 1176) ). There is no reason why this should generally be the case. Because the second-best program (4)
27 In our stylized model, the discontinuity arises from the discreteness of the units i and the fact that some may face positive marginal costs at ki = 0. Further discontinuities may arise from the fact that some adjustment margins may be limited by natural factors. For instance, if units are paid for afforestation and have a limited acreage ki ≤ki, there may be discontinuities at the point where a given unit has just exhausted its abatement potential.
involves an additional constraint compared to the first-best program (2), what is true is that the total abatement cost at a given abatement level cannot be higher under the first best. However, this ranking does not translate to marginal cost (except in the neighborhood of E = 0). Said differently, it is entirely plausible, and in some cases unavoidable, that at some abatement level E the curve λ 2 (E) lies below λ 1 (E).
Consider for instance the special case where the actions k i have a natural upper bound, sayk i , so that there exists some physical limit to abatement actions (the "physical potential" of the system, equal then toĒ ≡ i e i (k i )). Further assume that the cost functions c i are such that c i (k i ) < ∞. In that case, for large enough second-best incentives, all eligible abatement actions will be taken, that is,k i (p) =k i for all p ≥p, withp = max i c i (k i ) denoting the threshold price at which all units have contributed their entire physical potential. In effect, the social abatement cost atĒ is equal to i c i (k i ) no matter what the incentive scheme is. That is, the areas below the MSC curves up toĒ must be the same under the first-and second-best policies. Therefore, the two MSC curves must intersect and the second-best MSC curve must lie below the first-best one for a non-negligible range of abatement levels.
The intuition for this result can be further articulated as follows. Imagine that abatement actions consist of picking apples from a tree, and the cost of effort is proportional to the height at which the apple hangs. Assume that the emissions saved from picking an apple vary across apples in such a way that picking apples in ascending order of cost per unit of emissions saved, as the first-best mechanism would do, involves picking some higher-hanging apples first. A second-best mechanism that simply rewards the action of picking apples will result in lower-hanging fruit always being picked first, and therefore such mechanism will not replicate the first best. However, if desired abatement is such that all apples need to be picked, the total cost incurred will be the same whether or not apples are picked in ascending order.
